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ABSTRACT. This article focuses on consumer-generated reviews (CGRs) which are an 
increasingly influential source of consumer information. In particular, the article highlights specific 
problems associated with CGRs, which questions their role as a reliable information source. Flowing 
from this, the article calls for closer regulatory scrutiny of review platforms who play an important 
intermediary role in facilitating the provision of CGRs. To this end, the article considers possible 
regulatory responses in the European Union which may address some of the issues highlighted. 
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Under classical economic theory, consumers play an important role in maintaining market 
discipline because they can use their transactional decisions to ensure that suppliers act in their 
best interest.1 Optimal consumer decision-making is, however, dependent on access to 
complete and accurate information on the price, characteristics and quality of a commodity 
(and its substitutes) as well as the terms on which it is sold.2 In reality, obtaining information 
is costly and in some cases, impossible for consumers.3  The consequence is that consumers 
and suppliers often have an uneven amount of information which places them in unequal 
bargaining positions.4  
 
*  A version of this article was first presented at the Society of Legal Scholars Conference (UClan, 
Preston, 2019). My sincere thanks to Prof. Peter Cartwright and Prof Richard Hyde and the anonymous 
reviewers for their helpful comments on earlier drafts. All errors remain mine. 
1 G Howells, S Weatherill, Consumer Protection Law (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2nd edn, 2005) 32. 
2 ME Budnitz, M Rojo and J Marlowe 'Deceptive Claims for prepaid telephone cards and the need for 
regulation' (2006) 19 Loyola Consum.L.Rev 1,4. 
3 It is impossible to acquire complete information for products purchased on a “credence basis” because 
it may be impossible to access their value even after use or because their value may only become apparent 
with the passing of time: M Donnelly ‘The financial services ombudsman: asking the existential question’ 
(2012) 35 DULJ 232, 234. 
4 I Ramsay, Consumer Law and Policy (, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 3rd edn, 2012) 41 
N Ezechukwu  Legal Studies ISSN: 0261-3875 
 Consumer-generated reviews: time for closer scrutiny?     
Accordingly, regulatory intervention in consumer markets is frequently justified on the 
need to reduce information gaps to allow consumers make well-informed decisions reflecting 
their preferences.5 To this end, legislators and regulators deploy techniques aimed at improving 
consumer access to information. A commonly used technique is mandatory disclosure, which 
requires that businesses supply specific information to consumers.6 Mandatory disclosure aims 
to give disclosees the information required to make better decisions and to keep disclosers from 
abusing their superior position.7  
The use of mandatory disclosure has been criticised because it is thought to rest on “false 
assumptions about how people live, think, and make decisions.”8  Mandatory disclosure relies 
on the neo-classical assumption that consumers are rational and are the best judges of their 
interests who maximise their utility with the limited resources available.9 This assumption has 
been questioned by behavioural research which suggests that even when consumers have 
access to information, there is a tendency not to process such information correctly for several 
reasons, including the susceptibility to behavioural biases.10 
Ben-Shahar and Schneider provide a well-articulated criticism of mandatory disclosure 




5 G Howells, ‘The potential and limits of consumer empowerment by information’ (2005) 32 J Law & 
Soc'y 349, 355. 
6  P Latimer and P Maume, Promoting Information in the Marketplace for Financial Services 
(Switzerland: Springer, 2014) 28. 
7  O Ben-Shahar and C Schneider, ‘The failure of mandated disclosure’ (2011) 159 UPLR. 647, 649. 
8 Ibid, p 651. 
9 I Ramsay, ‘Rationales for intervention in the consumer marketplace’ (London, Office of Fair Trading 
1984) cited in Ramsay, above n 4, p 47. 
10 See, for example, HA Simon, ‘A behavioural model of rational choice’ (1955) 69(1) The Quarterly 
J of Econ. 99; A Tversky & D Kahneman, ‘Prospect theory: an analysis of decision under risk’ (1979) 
47(2) Econometrica 263; CR Sunstein, RH Thaler, Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth and 
Happiness (New Haven: Yale University Press 2008). 
11 O Ben-Shahar, CE Schneider More than You Wanted to Know: The Failure of Mandated Disclosure 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press 2014) 
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Faced with unfamiliar and complex decisions that disclosures are intended 
to inform, people don’t want to be educated, don’t want spreadsheets and 
don’t want scrolls. They want advice.12   
 
They highlight that many markets provide advice in the form of  ‘ratings, rankings, 
scores, grades, labels, warnings and reviews’ and that such advice often does better than 
disclosures in helping consumers make unfamiliar and complex decisions.13 Supporting their 
assertion, growing evidence suggests that consumers increasingly rely on one type of advice - 
consumer-generated reviews (CGRs) - when making transactional decisions.14 This trend is 
fuelled by the growth of electronic commerce and online platforms which allow consumers to 
share their evaluation of products. 
Since consumers rely on CGRs in decision-making, this alternative information stream 
invites closer scrutiny. This article has two goals. First, it will highlight specific problems 
which question the reliability of CGRs as a source of consumer information.15  Second, it 
considers regulatory responses which may address some of the problems highlighted. To this 
end, this article is structured as follows: Following this introduction, section one considers the 
growing emergence and merits of CGRs. Section two discusses certain problems associated 
with CGRs, while section three considers the appropriate regulatory responses to these 
problems. Conclusions are then drawn in section four.   
1. CONSUMER-GENERATED REVIEWS: AN ALTERNATIVE? 
 
 
12 Ibid, p 185 (emphasis added). 
13 Ibid, pp 185, 190. 
14 WW Moe and M Trusov ‘Measuring the value of social dynamics in online product ratings forums’ 
(2011) 48 JMR 444. 
15 This article focuses on reviews directly generated from consumers. Reviews from third-party expert 
intermediaries are not within the scope of the discussion. 
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Consumer-to-consumer information sharing is not novel because word-of-mouth information 
exchange amongst peers is an ancient communication mechanism.16 While word-of-mouth 
exchanges had a limited reach, the internet provides a low-cost channel for disseminating 
information on an unprecedented scale.17 With the rise of online transactions, it has become 
the norm for retail websites to incorporate forums enabling consumers to discuss their 
experiences of using products and dealing with suppliers.18 There are also independent 
websites solely dedicated to aggregating consumer reviews.19 These forums are usually free to 
access and primarily serve to facilitate information exchange amongst consumers.20  CGRs 
posted on these forums may come in the form of open-ended textual information on a product’s 
perceived quality.21 They may also come in the form of ratings where a consumer’s evaluation 
of a product is represented by a specified number on a scale or by the use of stars.22 Many 
online platforms combine both.  While ratings give consumers a quick indication of a product’s 
popularity, open-ended textual information provides specific details reflecting each reviewer’s 
experience.    
CGRs serve two functions.  First, they act as informants because they provide consumers 
with additional information derived from other consumers’ experiences.23 Second, they act as 
recommenders since they provide positive or negative signals about a product’s popularity, 
 
16 C Dellarocas ‘The digitization of word of mouth: promise and challenges of online feedback 
mechanisms’ (2003). 49 Manag. Sci. 1407, 1409. 
17 Ibid. 
18 J Schneider ‘10 Tactics for launching a product using social media’ (2015) available at  
https://hbr.org/2015/04/10-tactics-for-launching-a-product-using-social-media  
19 E.g. Trustpilot. 
20 WW Moe and M Trusov, The value of social dynamics in online product ratings forums (2011) 48 
JMR 444, 444. 
21 SP Eslami, MGhasemaghaei and K Hassanein ‘Which online reviews do consumers find most 
helpful? A multi-method investigation’ (2018) 118 DSS 32, 32.   
22 G Lackermair, D Kailer and K Kanmaz ‘Importance of online product reviews from a consumer's 
perspective’ (2013) 1(1) Advances in Economics and Business 1, 1. 
23 D Park and I Han ‘Integrating conflicting reviews: attributional hypotheses of consumer response to 
information uncertainty depending on prior brand attitude’  (2008) available at 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.466.3727&rep=rep1&type=pdf    
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which reflects the overall positive reviews that the product generates.24 These functions place 
CGRs as one of the most influential non-marketer sources of product information.25  Evidence 
suggests that CGRs affect the decision-making and purchasing behaviour of consumers.26  For 
instance, research carried out by Review Trackers reveals that 63.6 per cent of consumers are 
likely to check online reviews on Google before transacting with a business.27 94 per cent admit 
that a negative online review has convinced them to avoid a business. 28   
The influence of CGRs on consumer decision-making can be explained by certain 
benefits that they provide, which are discussed below.  
  
a) Reduces search costs 
To make optimal decisions, consumers must gather and process sufficient information on 
products as well as their substitutes. This process is costly in terms of money, time and effort.29 
If consumers believe that the cost of searching for information outweighs the benefit, they may 
settle for products that do not represent their preference or the best bargain that they could have 
obtained.30 
The internet contributes to reducing search costs by facilitating easy and timely access to 
CGRs at little to no cost.31 Consumers can access thousands of reviews on their personal 
computers or mobile devices which enables them to compare products and their prices.32 One 
 
24 Ibid. 
25 SA Gottschalk and A Mafael ‘Cutting through the online review jungle — investigating selective 
eWom processing’ (2017) 37 JIM 89, 91. 
26 Moe and Trusov, above n 20 p 444. 
27 https://www.reviewtrackers.com/reports/online-reviews-survey/  
28 Ibid. 
29  L Garrod, M Hviid and G Loomes et al 'Competition remedies in consumer markets' (2009) 21 LCLR 
439, 442. 
30 JH Russell 'Misbehavioral law and economics' (2018) 51 UMJLR 549, 557. 
31 DA Friedman ‘Do we need help using yelp: regulating advertising on mediated reputation systems’ 
(2017) 51 UMJLR 97, 126. 
32 S Colin ‘Innovation and the Online Consumer’ (2004) 26 Law & Policy 477, 479. 
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empirical study suggests that CGRs can reduce search time by about 25%33 which is valuable 
to consumers seeking relevant and timely information.34  
 
b) Reduces uncertainty 
 
Consumers face uncertainties online because parties are not physically transacting with each 
other and because many transactions are one-off events. Consumers’ uncertainty is also fuelled 
by the inability to verify the identity of suppliers and the attributes/quality of products before 
purchase.35 These uncertainties result from the lack of perfect information.36  
To overcome uncertainties, consumers read reviews to obtain information.37 Information 
acquired gives consumers some confidence since CGRs set clearer expectations of a product’s 
performance. In comparison to information provided by businesses, consumers also trust and 
place a higher value in the opinion of their peers.38 This may be because of the perceived non-
commercial motives of their peers.39 CGRs also emphasise information that consumers may 
have ignored or thought less-significant.40 For instance, reviews may highlight the difficulty in 
contacting a supplier to secure refunds for defective products – a less salient issue that 





Business-to-consumer information is often criticised as complex and product-oriented because 
it focuses on describing product attributes and performance in terms of technical 
 
33 N Amblee, R Ullah and W Kim ‘Do product reviews really reduce search costs? available at 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/317083455_Do_Product_Reviews_Really_Reduce_Search_Co
sts accessed 25th July 2019 p 4. 
34 Friedman, above n 31, p 130. 
35 S Chatterjee and P Datta ‘Examining Inefficiencies and consumer uncertainties in e-commerce’ 
(2008) 22 Communications of the Association for Information Systems 525, 528. 
36 Ibid, p 530. 
37 D Weathers, SD Swain and V Grover ‘Can online product reviews be more helpful? Examining 
characteristics of information content by product type’ (2015) 79 DSS 12, 12. 
38 Friedman, above n 31, 126. 
39 LM Willemsen, PC Neijens, et al ‘Highly recommended! the content characteristics and perceived 
usefulness of online consumer reviews’ (2011) JCMC 19. 
40 Ibid, p 15. 
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specifications.41 It is also usually voluminous, making it difficult for consumers to understand. 
Consequently, regulators often require that business-to-consumer disclosures are simplified.  
Simplification may involve drafting disclosures in simple language or streamlining the 
presentation of disclosed content.42 However, Ben-Shahar and Schneider explain that 
‘simplifying [disclosures] fail because the complex isn’t simple and can’t easily be made so.’43 
Simply put, it is challenging to present complicated information in written language that most 
people understand.44    
Because CGRs are written from a consumer perspective, in comparison to disclosures, 
they may convey information in a less complicated manner.45 Being expressed in more 
relatable language, consumers may find them easier to understand. They will not be as lengthy 
as disclosures and will provide information that is based on user experience.   
 
 
d) Good Mechanism for Disciplining Firms:  
 
The internet provides a relatively cheap medium which allows consumers to reveal the actions 
of suppliers and to attract other consumers’ attention in the process.46 Suppliers care about 
CGRs because they can affect future profits.47 If many CGRs express dissatisfaction with a 
firm’s products, it creates a negative perception of the product and the firm’s reputation. Since 
perception can impact sales, suppliers have an incentive to behave appropriately.48  
 
Some commentators believe that the potential to discipline firms can impact the 
regulation of contracts terms. Taylor argues that if a firm’s reputation is attacked because 
 
41 Park and Han, above n 34. 
42 O Ben-Shahar and A Chilton ‘Simplification of privacy disclosures: an experimental test’ (2016) 
45(2) JLS 541, 542-543. 
43 Ben-Shahar & Schneider, above n 7, p 123. 
44 CE Schneider and MA Hall 'The patient life: can consumers direct health care' (2009) 35 AM JL & 
Med 7, 42. 
45 Park and Han, above n 23, p 1. 
46 MN Helveston 'Regulating digital markets' (2016) 13 NYU JL & Bus 33, 49 
47 Dellarocas, above n 16, p 1410. 
48 Ibid, p 1408.  
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consumers criticise their contract terms, the firm may be motivated to change unfavourable 
terms.49 Echoing this, Becher and Zarsky contend that the information flow between consumers 
will force suppliers to remove unfair terms, especially where a possibility exists that consumers 
will refrain from contracting with them.50 While this may be true in some cases,51 discussions 
in section two will show that this is an optimistic view because it rests on the assumption that 
many consumers will be motivated enough to read contract terms and to write reviews 
assessing them. 
 
2. PROBLEMS WITH CONSUMER-GENERATED REVIEWS 
 
The integrity of available information affects the quality of consumer decision-making. While 
CGRs contribute to reducing information gaps, certain concerns question their role as a reliable 
source of consumer information. These concerns are considered below. 
 
a) Bias 
CGRs can leave consumers with misleading, inaccurate or false information because a 
product’s aggregated reviews may not reflect the unbiased opinion of other consumers.52 
Information contained in CGRs may be biased for several reasons discussed below.  
 
i. FAKE REVIEWS 
Since CGRs can impact sales, businesses are incentivised to ensure that reviews remain 
positive.53 Consequently, they may commission fake reviews by paying for them or by planting 
 
49 RB Taylor ‘Consumer-driven changes to online form contracts’ (2011) 67 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 
371, 378.  
50 SI Becher and TZ Zarsky ‘E-contract doctrine 2.0: standard form contracting in the age of online user 
participation’ (2008) 14 Mich. Telecomm. & Tech. L. Rev. 303.  
51 In 2011, a campaign led by a customer forced the Bank of America to redefine its debit card fee 
structure. Available at https://www.businessinsider.com/molly-katchpole-petition-leads-ordinary-mans-
fight-against-bank-of-america-debit-fees-2011-10?r=US&IR=T 
52 J Malbon ‘Taking fake online consumer reviews seriously’ (2013) 36 JCP 149. 
53 X Li and LM Hitt ‘Self-Selection and information role of online product reviews’ (2007) available 
at https://faculty.wharton.upenn.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Self-selection.pdf  p 5. 
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them on platforms using automated software programs (bots).54 Enforcement cases highlight 
this problem. In 2019, the US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) announced its first case 
challenging a marketer’s use of fake paid reviews.55 The defendants allegedly paid a third-party 
website to create and post Amazon reviews of its weight-loss pill. These sham reviews helped 
the product attain a 5-star rating on Amazon. The court order settling the FTC’s complaint, 
amongst other things, required that notices detailing the FTC’s complaints be emailed to 
consumers who had purchased the product.  
Similarly, in 2014, Bell Canada’s employees were encouraged to post positive reviews 
of the company’s apps on the iTunes and Google Play Store.56 These reviews were posted 
without the reviewers disclosing that they were Bell Canada employees. Canada’s Competition 
Bureau determined that the reviews ‘created the general impression that they were made by 
independent and impartial consumers and temporarily affected the overall star rating for the 
apps.’57 The Bureau required that Bell Canada enhance its compliance program to ensure that 
employees would not review products. 58  
The practices highlighted in these cases can undermine the reliability of the information 
contained in CGRs.59 Even where consumers are cautious, they are cognitively ill-equipped to 
identify fake reviews because humans have a truth bias. This means that they are likely to 
 
54 LM Ponte ‘Mad men posing as ordinary consumers: the essential role of self-regulation and industry 
ethics on decreasing deceptive online consumer ratings and reviews’ (2013) 12 J. Marshall Rev Intell Prop 






59 They also raise wider competition concerns because they put honest competitors who do not adopt 
similar practices at a disadvantage. Y Procaccia and A Harel ‘On the optimal regulation of unread 
contracts’ (2012) 8(1) Rev  Law & Economics 59-89, 76.  
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believe information reported as true rather than false.60 This raises problems because decisions 
influenced by sham reviews may not be optimal.  
Many CGRs are written anonymously, and the inability to verify a reviewer’s identity is 
associated with the higher possibility of fake reviews. Platforms like Amazon adopt 
mechanisms which aim to partly resolve this. For instance, verified purchasers have an 
indicative badge on their reviews. However, Amazon also permits reviews written by unverified 
purchasers. This means that reviews written by unverified purchasers, who may or may not be 
fake reviewers, can influence a product’s overall rating.   
 
 
ii. CONTRIBUTOR INTEGRITY AND COMPETENCE 
Genuine reviews may be biased due to the reviewer’s experience or motivation. Contributor 
integrity problems exist in online forums because consumers cannot verify a reviewer’s 
knowledge or reliability.61 This is significant because such interactions are usually non-
recurring.62  
A reviewer’s knowledge and experience affects the quality of information that they 
provide. For instance, an experienced long-term user of a product may provide better 
information than a first-time user. Thus, if the reviewer is incompetent or inexperienced, then 
the advice they provide may be inaccurate and misleading.63 It is usually difficult or near 
impossible for consumers to identify which reviews have been written by experienced or 
knowledgeable peers. Although some reviewers leave cues indicating their experience, these 
are not easily verifiable. 64 
 
60 CNH Street and A Kingstone ‘Aligning spinoza with descartes: an informed cartesian account of the 
truth bias’ (2017) 108 BJP 453, 453. 
61 Commonly described as an accreditation problem: Becher and Zarsky, above n 50, p 333. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid, p 334. 
64 Cues could include statements like ‘I have used this product for five years’ which indicate experience 
and knowledge. 
N Ezechukwu  Legal Studies ISSN: 0261-3875 
 Consumer-generated reviews: time for closer scrutiny?     
Moreover, reviewers do not have strong incentives to post truthful information. This 
directly contrasts with firms required to provide mandatory disclosures. Such firms will face 
regulatory sanctions and lawsuits if they fail to provide truthful information.65 Should a 
consumer’s transactional decision be induced by false or misleading disclosures,  laws like the 
UK’s Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations (CPUTRs)66 will protect them. 
However, if an anonymous review induces a transaction, in the absence of a direct contractual 
link with the reviewer, the consumer may have no remedy.67 Anonymous reviewers will also 
not qualify as traders for the CPUTRs to apply.68 
Contributor integrity problems can also be linked to the fact that when writing reviews, 
consumers may be motivated by factors other than the objective evaluation of a product. For 
instance, evidence suggests that social influence bias affects how consumers write reviews.69 
Consumers do not write reviews in isolation. They are often exposed to numerous information 
signals within the review platforms which affect the objective assessment of a product. 70 
Schlosser, for instance, finds that consumers may negatively adjust their review after reading a 
negative review.71 She theorizes that this may be because consumers seek to differentiate their 
reviews and negative reviews stand out because they are perceived as more intelligent.72 
Confirming the existence of social influence bias,  another study shows that consumers who 
 
65The aggrieved consumer may also sue for breach of contract or misrepresentation. 
66 (2008); Regulation 5 prohibits misleading actions which could involve the use of false information 
which causes or is likely to cause the average consumer to take a transactional decision that he would not 
otherwise have taken. 
67 The aggrieved consumer cannot also sue under tort law (negligent misstatements) as there needs to 
be a special relationship which exists between the parties that justifies the existence of a duty of care. 
68 Regulation 2(1) defines a trader as “any person who in relation to a commercial practice is acting for 
purposes relating to his business, and anyone acting in the name of or on behalf of a trader.” 
69 G Askalidis, SJ Kim and EC Malthouse ‘Understanding and overcoming biases in online review 
systems’ (2017) 97 DSS 23, 25. 
70 S Cicognani, P Figini and M Magnani ‘Social influence bias in online ratings: a field experiment’ 
(2016) available at  https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/d5a3/9b7d1fbfbdcd61dfc575fe71cc9fd2b54bf0.pdf   
p 4. 
71 A Schlosser ‘Posting versus lurking: communicating in a multiple audience context’ (2005) 32 (2) J. 
Consum. Res, 260–65 cited in Moe and Trusov, above n 31, p 446. 
72 Ibid. 
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received email invitations and who could not see reviews written by their peers consistently 
provided higher ratings when compared to self-motivated reviews provided by those who had 
access to other reviews.73  
The signals as to product quality provided by aggregated CGRs may also be skewed 
because many consumers self-select to provide reviews. Hu et al point out that reviews are often 
written by consumers who are either extremely satisfied or dissatisfied.74  The averagely 
satisfied consumers who may represent the majority are less likely to write reviews.75 Hence, 
the information provided in CGRs may reflect only the views of a vocal minority. Such 
information will be biased since it is written by a non- representative sample of consumers.76   
 
iii. PLATFORM MANIPULATION 
Sometimes, review platforms (RPs) may not be neutral, and this can affect the quality of the 
information exchanged. Bias on such platforms may be traced to the RPs’ business structure.  
RPs may be grouped as ‘stand-alone’ platforms or ‘supportive’ platforms.77 Stand-alone 
platforms are solely designed to allow consumers to share reviews. Such platforms often rely 
on advertising and subscription revenue.78  Examples include Trustpilot and Yelp.  Supportive 
platforms also allow the sharing of reviews, but they are supplementary to a larger forum for 
facilitating transactions.79  An example would be Amazon.   
Friedman explains that because stand-alone platforms need to generate revenue through 
advertising, promotions, and sales-commission, they are subject to tensions arising from 
potential conflicts of interest.80 This is because they seek to provide a neutral platform for 
 
73 Askalidis et al, above n 69, p 28. 
74 N Hu, PA Pavlou and J Zhang ‘Overcoming the j-shaped distribution of product reviews’ (2009) 
52(10) Communications of the ACM 144, 145. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid, p 146. 
77 Friedman, above n 31, p 111. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Friedman, above n 31, p 111. 
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consumers while at the same time providing a worthwhile return for advertisers.81 Supportive 
platforms are less susceptible to such tension since they only constitute a part of a bigger 
platform.82 
The difficulty in balancing competing interests suggests that stand-alone platforms are 
susceptible to abuse. Suppliers can purchase a persuasive presence on such platforms and may 
pay for their products to be promoted first.83 Suppliers may pay for positive reviews to be 
highlighted, or for negative reviews to be censored, all of which can skew a consumer’s 
assessment of a product.84  Instead of encountering unbiased CGRs, consumers will have to 
deal with information aimed at persuading rather than informing.  Decisions induced by a 
deliberate redirection of information to fit advertising interests will likely yield sub-optimal 
outcomes.85 
A class-action suit against a US review website, Angie’s List, highlights this problem.86 
The complaint alleged that Angie’s List concealed from consumers the fact that businesses 
could influence their ratings by paying to either appear higher in rankings or by suppressing 
unfavourable reviews. Where a business had paid advertising fees, negative reviews would not 
be counted when compiling ratings, and such reviews were made unreadable.87 Angie’s List 
also allegedly altered its rankings by suppressing positive reviews unless a business paid for 
advertising. Angie’s List denied that advertising revenue could affect ratings and stated that it 
disclosed receipt of revenue from businesses with high ratings. It, however, agreed that in 
 
81 Ibid 
82  Friedman, above n 31, p 111. 
83 Ibid, p 103. 
84 Becher & Zarsky, above n 50, pp 333-334. 
85 Friedman, above n 31, p 101. 
86 Moore v. Angie's List, Civil Action No. 15-1243. United States District Court, (E.D. Pennsylvania, 
August 7 2015) available at https://www.leagle.com/decision/infdco20150810c79 
87 Ibid. 
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certain situations, revenue accepted from businesses could affect the ranking of  search results. 
Eventually, Angie’s List agreed to settle the lawsuit by paying the settlement class.  
Platform manipulation places consumers in a vulnerable position because they are given 
a false sense of empowerment in believing that they are making well-informed decisions when, 
in fact, their decisions are based on manipulated information. Decisions based on skewed 







b) Limited coverage 
 
Informed decision-making requires that consumers assess product features and price, as well as  
the terms on which they will contract. If consumers pay attention to contract terms and shop 
around for the most favourable ones, then suppliers will be incentivised to offer fair terms.88 
Conversely, if consumers pay no attention to contract terms, then suppliers will reduce their 
costs and risks by offering one-sided terms.89 To combat this, one aspect of regulating contract 
terms requires their transparent disclosure, especially if they significantly impact a consumer’s 
interest.90  
Increased access to contract terms suggests that consumers will evaluate them before 
transacting. However, this is not always the case. Marrotta-Wurgler points out that consumers 
do not read the fine print and increased disclosures do not necessarily translate to increased 
engagement with contract terms.91 Some authors, however, contend that CGRs can contribute 
to solving this problem. For instance, Peppet argues that a consumer’s review is likely to 
 
88 F Marotta-Wurgler ‘Does contract disclosure matter’ (2012) available at 
https://www.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/contract-economic-
organization/files/Marotta-Wurgler%20paper.pdf p 2. 
89 Ibid. 
90 E.g. exclusion clauses. See the approach under the EU’s Unfair Contracts Term Directive 93/13/EEC. 
91 Marotta-Wurgler (above n 88) p 3. 
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evaluate a product based on multiple variables, one of which is the consumer's experience with 
the supplier's contract terms.92 Becher and Zarsky reason that consumers who encounter 
negative reviews about a supplier’s terms will pay attention to the contract terms when deciding 
to transact.93 Therefore, ex-ante consumers will benefit from reviews provided by ex-post 
consumers who have experienced the contract terms.94   
While these arguments have merit, certain matters must be considered before concluding 
that CGRs can assist with information on contract terms. First, CGRs will only be a useful 
source of information on contract terms if there are actual opinions on contract terms.95 Unlike 
mandatory disclosure where regulation dictates content, CGRs cover several issues, the scope 
of which is determined by the reviewer.  CGRs may focus on a range of issues,  and there is no 
obligation to discuss contract terms. Hence, CGRs may provide no information on contract 
terms.96   
Second, Becher and Zarsky appear to assume that a sufficient number of ex-post 
consumers can understand contract terms, identify unfair ones and write reviews detailing their 
experiences with such terms. They also seem to assume that ex-ante consumers will easily 
identify such reviews and act on them. Since literature confirms that few consumers read 
disclosures about contract terms, it means that only a small pool of consumers can write 
reviews assessing them.97 Even when the terms are read, consumers may not give them 
considerable weight in their assessment of a product on balance with other features.98  
 
92 SR Peppet ‘Freedom of contract in an augmented reality: the case of consumer contracts’ (2012) 59 
UCLA L Rev 676, 726. 
93 Becher and Zarsky, above n 50, pp 352-353. 
94 Ibid, p 355. 
95 F Marotta-Wurgler ‘Even more than you wanted to know about the failures of disclosure’ (2015) 11 
Jrslm Rev Legal Stud 63, pp 71-72. 
96 R Van Loo ‘The rise of the digital regulator’ (2017) 66 Duke LJ 1267, p 1289. 
97 Ibid, p 72. 
98 NV Chari ‘Disciplining standard form contract terms through online information flows: an empirical 
study’ (2010) 85 NYU L Rev 1618, 1645. 
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Becher and Zarsky's argument is questioned by empirical research suggesting that 
reviews are unlikely to serve as an effective conduit for passing information on contract terms 
because many consumers do not take contract bias99 into account when writing reviews.100 
Chari found that highly-rated products on Amazon often have pro-seller terms and that 
although reviews may contain information on contract terms, they are not conveyed in a way 
that is useful to ex-ante consumers.101 
Ex-post consumers may not write about their experiences with contract terms unless they 
have suffered a negative experience linked to the enforcement of such term.102 If a negative 
experience never occurs, it is unlikely that such terms will be addressed in a CGR. Even where 
consumers have negative experiences, suppliers can adopt mechanisms to discourage them 
from posting reviews that draw attention to such terms.103 These mechanisms could include 
prompt dispute settlement or voluntary forbearance of contractual rights in the form of refunds 
and exchanges.  If this is the case, CGRs may not discuss the unfair term. Even if a review 
discusses a dispute arising from a term’s application but reports prompt resolution, other 
consumers may discount the unfavourable term as they may believe that a similar approach 
(prompt and favourable resolution) will be extended to them even though this is not guaranteed.   
In other instances, CGRs on contract terms may not be presented in an explicit manner 
that is useful to ex-ante consumers. As stated earlier, since consumers do not often read contract 
term disclosures, they will usually experience controversial terms accidentally when a dispute 
concerning its application arises.104 Many consumers view such disputes in the abstract and are 
cannot link them to contractual provisions.105 Hence, a review may describe a trader’s customer 
 
99 "Bias" means the extent to which contract terms favour buyers or sellers. Ibid, p 1621. 
100  Chari above n 98, p 1645. 
101 Ibid, p 1618.  
102 Becher and Zarsky, above n 50, p 315. 
103 Ibid, p 318. 
104 Ibid, p 315. 
105 Ibid. 
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service as lousy/inflexible when the actual source of their discontent is the application of a 
contract term.106 Such a review may not point out the problematic term(s) and, therefore, cannot 
place an ex-ante consumer in a position to make adjustments in response to such terms. 
As noted earlier, CGRs may be textual or indicated by a review score. While textual 
reviews will be more useful for providing information on contract terms, review scores only 
reveal the overall perception of a product. As consumer preferences differ, they will apportion 
weight inconsistently to different factors/product features when arriving at a score. If ex-ante 
consumers cannot identify the extent to which reviews are based on the quality of contract 
terms, then such reviews are difficult to use as a proxy of contract term quality.107  
Many consumer transactions are based on standard form contracts (SFCs). Terms 
contained in SFCs are frequently updated to adapt to market, regulatory and technological 
developments.108 If CGRs were to contain relevant assessments of an SFCs’ terms, their effect 
might be negated by these frequent changes. This is because these changes can render the 
information flow irrelevant since reviews provided by ex-post consumers on outdated terms 
will be unhelpful to ex-ante consumers.109 The way reviews are compiled can also exacerbate 
this problem. If platform operators do not set time frames for removing obsolete reviews, there 
is a likelihood that reviews covering SFCs that have since been updated will continue to 
influence consumer decision-making. Where CGRs discuss outdated terms, the information 
they provide will be inconsequential or misleading.  
The relevance of CGRs discussing contract terms may also be negated if contract term 
discrimination exists.  Contract term discrimination covers ex-ante discrimination, where a 
 
106 Ibid. 
107 Peppet, above n 92, p 726. 
108 F Marotta-Wurgler and R Taylor ‘Set in stone: change and innovation in consumer standard-form 
contracts’ (2013) 88 NYU L Rev 240, 247. 
109 Becher and Zarsky, above n 50, p 359. 
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seller offers different terms to different consumers at contract formation.110 It also includes ex-
post discrimination where in resolving disputes, sophisticated or assertive consumers obtain 
remedies that are not available to other consumers.111 If consumers purchasing the same 
product are subject to different terms, this can distort the flow of reliable information. In such 
situations, CGRs containing information on contract terms may not be accurately 





c) Not suitable for all types of goods 
 
Goods are sometimes classified based on how easily consumers can acquire and evaluate 
information about them before purchase. To this end, goods can be classified as search, 
experience, or credence goods.113 Search goods are defined as those whose attributes can be 
observed and verified before purchase.114  Experience goods are those whose quality can only 
be known after use while credence goods are those whose quality cannot be determined or 
verified even after purchase and use.115  
When consumers purchase search goods in a brick and mortar setting, the information 
contained in CGRs will only serve to reinforce or confirm judgments held about a product since 
 
110 Ibid, p 309. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Ibid. 
113 P Nelson ‘Information and consumer behaviour’ (1970) 78(2) JPE 331; MR Darby and E Karni 
‘Free competition and optimal amount of fraud’ (1973) 16 JLE 67. 
114 OECD Consumer Policy Toolkit (2010) available at https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264079663-en p 
34. 
115 Ibid, p 35. 
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the quality is observable before purchase.116 In online environments, detailed descriptive CGRs 
can take on a more prominent role in confirming the product’s search attributes.117 
Information asymmetry problems are more pronounced in transactions involving 
experience and credence goods because consumers cannot verify their quality before 
purchase.118 One concern linked to this information asymmetry is that in situations where it is 
impossible to establish a good’s quality in advance, consumers will only be prepared to pay an 
average price corresponding to the average expected quality. Sellers of high-quality goods will 
be unwilling to sell at that asking price and will withdraw from the market. The result is that 
the product quality will decline as will the price consumers are willing to pay.119 Reducing 
information asymmetry is, therefore, necessary to avoid such market failure.  
While disclosures from suppliers may mitigate this problem, concerns remain that the 
nature of experience and credence goods make disclosures inadequate in reducing pre-purchase 
uncertainties.120 Since CGRs detail consumer experiences with products, one can assume that 
they will be more useful to ex-ante consumers purchasing experience and credence goods.121 
In these cases, consumers often attach a higher weight to reviewer agreement than the actual 
 
116 W Tsao and M Hsieh ‘eWOM persuasiveness: do eWOM platforms and product type matter’ (2015) 
15(4) ECR, 509, 519. 
117 Y Wan, M Nakayama and J Qin ‘A test of search-experience-credence framework through online 





Review.pdf p 2. 
118 L Pan and J Chiou ‘How much can you trust online information? cues for perceived trustworthiness 
of consumer-generated online information’ (2011) 25 JIM 67, pp 69-70. 
119 George Akerlof identified this phenomenon (Market for lemons) in his article ‘The market for 
“lemons”: quality uncertainty and the market mechanism’ (1970) 84(3) QJE 488. 
120 G Lewis ‘Asymmetric Information, Adverse Selection and Online Disclosure: The case of eBay 
motors’ (2011) 101 Am. Econ. Rev, 1535; H Hong, D Xua and GA Wang et al ‘Understanding the 
determinants of online review helpfulness: a meta-analytic investigation’ (2017) 102 DSS 1, 4. 
121 S Senecal and J Nantel ‘The influence of online product recommendations on consumer online 
choices’ (2004) 80 J. Retail 159,160. 
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information contained in reviews.122 This means that consumers assess the credibility of the 
information in a review by observing the degree to which other reviewers agree on the quality 
of the product being reviewed.123   
Peppet, therefore, reasons that if sufficient reviews about experience and credence goods 
are aggregated, then such goods can transform into search goods which are easily evaluated 
before purchase.124 Peppet’s argument may find merit with experience goods. Since the quality 
of experience goods can be evaluated after purchase, consistent reviewer agreement on certain 
qualities may indicate a product’s suitability. However, Peppet appears to assume that 
information contained in CGRs are a fool-proof indication of product quality. This assumption 
poses certain problems. First, the quality evaluations of many experience and credence 
products are subjective and dependent on user experience.125 Consumer preferences differ, and 
so their perception of quality will reflect this, which will, in turn, influence how they evaluate 
products. 
Furthermore, products are often complex and, one product may possess different 
attributes simultaneously.126 A product may possess search, experience and credence attributes 
all at once. 127 Reviews of such products can provide unintentionally misleading information. 
This is because consumers will attach varying levels of importance to the different attributes, 
and their reviews may not indicate this.128  Even where consumers can appreciate the 
complexity of a product’s attributes, they may value the wrong features in the short term. This 
 
122 FR Jiménez, NA Mendoza ‘Too popular to ignore: the influence of online reviews on purchase 
intentions of search and experience products’ (2013) 27(3) JIM 226, 231. 
123 Ibid. 
124 Peppet, above n 92, p 714. 
125 S Sen and D Lerman ‘Why are you telling me this? An examination into negative consumer reviews 
on the Web’ (2007) 21(4) JIM 76–94.  
126 Li & Hitt above n 53, p 7. 
127 Ibid; Y Wan, M Nakayama and N Sutcliffe ‘The impact of age and shopping experiences on the 
classification of search, experience, and credence goods in online shopping’ (2012) 10(1) Information 
Systems and e-Business Management 135, 138. 
128 Ibid. 
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is because owing to cognitive limitations, consumers do not always weigh the present and 
future costs and benefits of a decision and can be myopic in the short term.129 
Moreover, for CGRs to provide a credible proxy for product quality, they must 
communicate the actual average quality of the product being reviewed.130  This is only possible 
if available CGRs are representative of the consumer population.131 As mentioned previously, 
consumers self-select to write reviews making it difficult to meet this requirement.132 Reviews 
are usually written by extremely satisfied or dissatisfied consumers who do not represent the 
average consumer’s experience.133 
Li and Hitt’s empirical study of the book market is instructive.134  A book’s author can 
be inspected before purchase and qualifies as a search attribute while the content can only be 
evaluated after reading, thereby qualifying as an experience attribute.135 Consumers attracted 
to the search attributes (an author’s fans) will likely buy the author’s book early and will rate 
the book highly in comparison to the rest of the population.136 Their reviews though truthful, 
will not be representative of all consumers. 
With credence goods, the situation is more complicated. Empirical evidence suggests 
that most CGRs focus on discussing consumer experiences with search and experience 
goods.137  This is unsurprising because it is difficult to evaluate the quality of credence products 
after use. Hence, consumers may be cautious about reviewing such products.138 Moreover, 
because a product’s search and experience attributes are easier to evaluate, consumers are more 
 
129 Consumer preferences are also not consistent over time. Ramsay, above n 4, p 57. 
130 Li & Hitt above n 53, p 8. 
131 Ibid. 
132 See discussions in section 2(a)(ii). 
133 Hu et al, above n 74, p 145. 
134 Li & Hitt above n 53, p 7. 
135 Li & Hitt above n 53, p 7. 
136 Ibid, p 8. 
137 Tsao and Hsieh, above n 116, p 510. 
138 Pan and Chiou, above n 118, p 70. 
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likely to write reviews in the early stage of a product’s lifecycle.139 The difficulty with 
assessing credence goods means that consumers will spend more time evaluating them before 
they write reviews140 (if they eventually write one). 
Even where reviews of credence goods are available, they may be an unreliable source 
of information on product quality or suitability. This is because many complex credence goods, 
like financial products, are often tailored to the specific circumstances of consumers.  For 
instance, a mortgage plan is tailored to a consumer’s financial status, and what is suitable for 
one may be unsuitable for another. The credence nature of a mortgage plan also means that the 
precise value of the product may never be known. Owing to these complexities, CGRs of such 
products often focus on ancillary issues. For instance, a financial product’s reviews may 
comment on a bank representative’s professionalism, the ambience of a branch or the waiting 
time. While this is helpful information, it does not provide a clearer assessment of the product’s 
quality or suitability. 
 
 
d) Cognitive limitations 
 
As indicated in the introduction, one reason cited for the failure of mandatory disclosure is that 
it relies on the neo-classical assumption that consumers are rational and are the best judges of 
their interests who maximise their utility with the limited resources available.141 In reality, 
consumers are not unboundedly rational, and this is exhibited by judgment errors and 
deviations from the precepts of expected utility theory.142 Judgment errors are often linked to 
the limitations associated with the human capacity to process information. When faced with 
 
139 Wan et al, above n 117, p 3. 
140 Ibid. 
141 Ramsay above n 9 p 47. 
142 C Jolls and CR Sunstein ‘Debiasing through law’ (2006) 35 JLS 199, 203. 
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too much information, consumers rely on mental shortcuts to justify their decisions.143 Reliance 
on these shortcuts can lead to cognitive biases.144 
As stated earlier, Ben-Shahar and Schneider assert that when making unfamiliar 
decisions, consumers prefer advice such as reviews.145 They appear to assume that consumers 
are cognitively better-equipped to process information acquired through advice. This 
assumption cannot stand because consumer rationality remains limited, notwithstanding the 
information source. Information contained in CGRs, like any other information, is subject to 
the limitations of human information processing.146 Thus, cognitive biases can also affect how 
consumers process CGRs. 
When deciding whether to purchase a product, consumers will often have access to a 
large pool of reviews.147 For instance, at the time of writing, consumers wishing to buy a set of 
TaoTronics wireless Bluetooth headphones on Amazon will have access to about 18,350 
reviews.148 While this provides consumers with multiple perspectives, the large volume can 
lead to information overload. Assessing these reviews will be daunting because consumers 
must go through multiple reviews to decide which is credible and relevant.149   
As stated earlier,  information overload will force consumers to settle on mental shortcuts 
which can lead to cognitive biases. For example, consumers will be prone to the bandwagon 
effect when decision-making relies on CGRs. The bandwagon effect indicates that people are 
more likely to make a choice that is popular amongst an existing majority.150 Platforms 
 
143 KB Schulz ‘Information flooding’ (2015) 48 ILR. 755,759. 
144 Jolls and Sunstein, above n 142, p 204. 
145 See introduction. 
146 MJ Thomas, B Wirtz, JC Weyerer ‘Determinants of online review credibility and its impact on 
consumers' purchase intention’ (2019) 20(1) JECR 1, 3. 




149 Jiménez and Mendoza, above n 122, p 234. 
150 R Schmitt-Beck ‘Bandwagon effect’ in G Mazzoleni (ed) The International Encyclopedia of 
Political Communication. Volume 1 (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 1st edn, 2016) p 56. 
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incorporate mechanisms that allow consumers to signal agreement with a review. For instance, 
Amazon allows consumers to indicate if a review is helpful. This generates statistical 
information on the number of consumers endorsing a review.151 These endorsement 
mechanisms affect the perception of particular reviews and can induce a bandwagon effect.152 
Consumers may process such mechanisms as heuristic cues for evaluating the credibility of 
information supplied.153  
The level of reviewer agreement can also trigger the bandwagon heuristic. One study 
indicates that consumers may purchase a product because most reviews agree on the quality of 
certain attributes which they consider important. 154  Focusing on the online purchase of books, 
another study confirms this.155 Results showed that consumers rely on the sales volume and 
star ratings of a book to evaluate its quality.156 A high sales volume or star rating indicates a 
products’ popularity. Basing a decision on these indicators can be tricky because the reviewers 
may not be a truly representative class, and the information signals about quality may not be 
accurate. 
Consumers may also be subject to confirmation bias when processing information in 
CGRs. They may justify their decisions by latching onto particular CGRs which confirm their 
preconceived notions of a product.157 Consumers tend to perceive CGRs that confirm their 
initial impression of a product as more helpful.158 Since the initial impression may be 
influenced by the average rating of the product, one consequence of confirmation bias is that 
 
151 T Wu and CA Lin ‘Predicting the effects of eWOM and Online Brand Messaging: Source Trust, 
Bandwagon effect and Innovation Adoption Factors’ (2017) 34 Telematics and Informatics 470, 473. 
152 Ibid. 
153 Ibid. 
154 Jiménez and Mendoza, above n 122, p 233. 
155 F Chen ‘Herd behavior in purchasing books online’ (2008) 24(5) Computers in Human Behavior 
1977. 
156 Ibid, pp 1984-1985. 
157 Friedman, above n 31, p 595. 
158 D Yin, S Mitra, H Zhang ‘When do consumers value positive vs. negative reviews? an empirical 
investigation of confirmation bias in online word of mouth’ (2016) 27(1) ISR 131. 
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the perceived helpfulness of a review is dependent on a product’s average rating.159 If a product 
has high positive ratings with an average of five-stars, negative reviews are perceived as 
deviating from the average rating and will not be considered helpful.160 The opposite would 
apply to products with low ratings. Thus, consumers may disregard CGRs that contradict their 
initial perception of a product informed by its ratings.  
When processing information, consumers may also be subject to the overconfidence bias. 
Consumers can be overconfident about their abilities and may believe that in carrying out an 
action, they will enjoy an outcome better than the average expected outcome.161 This will, for 
instance, cause consumers to overestimate their ability to navigate contract terms162 or to ignore 
generic warnings because they assume that a problem will not affect them.163 Peppet argues 
that  online environments may neutralise consumers’ overconfidence because ‘reading online 
consumer reviews highlights the obvious but important fact that sheer volume of experience 
uncovers even very low-probability contingencies.’164  This implies that CGRs will put 
consumers on notice about the occurrence of different outcomes, thus lessening the incidents 
of overconfident decisions.165  
Although it is tempting to agree with this view, one must note that a consumer’s optimism 
bias can erode the gains Peppet expects. Optimism bias refers to people’s tendency to believe 
that the probability of them facing a bad outcome is lower than it actually is.166  Because CGRs 
are subjective, aggregated reviews can contain conflicting information that makes it 
challenging to decipher which is credible.167 Notwithstanding a significant number of 
 
159 Ibid, p 132. 
160 Ibid, p 134. 
161 OECD, above n 114 p 75; Sunstein & Thaler, above n 10, p 32. 
162 D Grubb ‘Overconfident consumers in the marketplace’ (2015) 29(4) J Econ Perspect. 9, 9 
163 Ramsay above n 4, p 58. 
164 Peppet, above n 92, p 739. 
165 Ibid, p 739; Becher and Zarsky, above n 50, p 355. 
166 Jolls and Sunstein, above n 142, p 204. 
167 H Hong, D Xua and GA Wang et al ‘Understanding the determinants of online review helpfulness: 
A meta-analytic investigation’ (2017) 102 DSS 1, 1. 
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complaints about a product, some exceptional positive experiences may lead consumers to 
expect that the latter will be their likely outcome.168 Thus, even with access to accurate 
information on possible contingencies, optimism bias may cause consumers to underestimate 
their personal risks.169 
Tversky and Kahneman explain that there are situations in which people assess the 
probability of an event by the ease with which examples can be brought to mind.170 While this 
availability heuristic can be useful when assessing frequency or probability, it can also lead to 
bias.171  This bias can affect consumers relying on CGRs because they may use information 
from specific reviews as a heuristic for what the broader picture looks like.172 Hence the 
expected outcome of a transactional decision may be based on an easily recalled peer 
experience.173 
Consumers may make decisions relying on any of these biases and may even express 
satisfaction with it, but there remains a possibility that they have forgone a superior 
transaction.174 With the susceptibility to these biases, one must question whether, in 
comparison to mandatory disclosures, consumers are better placed to process the information 
obtained from reviews. While CGRs may contribute towards providing consumers with 
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3.  REGULATORY CONSIDERATIONS 
 
The challenge for regulators is to ensure that where possible, consumers make decisions 
based on fair information. Some of the issues raised in section two, such as bias, can be 
minimised through regulation. Resolving other problems linked with cognitive limitations will 
be trickier because of inherent human limitations. Nonetheless, since RPs play an intermediary 
role in facilitating the exchange of CGRs, this article takes the view that they should be at the 
centre of regulatory efforts addressing some of highlighted the issues. Accordingly, discussions 






a) Is regulatory intervention necessary? 
 
Some authors suggest that regulation may be unnecessary because RPOs have an incentive to 
prevent the abuse of RPs.176 Friedman explains that to keep RPs relevant, RPOs must attract, 
retain and engage consumers.177 If consumers suspect that a platform is compromised, they 
will disengage. The competition for users, therefore, inspires RPOs to develop self-regulatory 
mechanisms to compete on grounds of utility and credibility.178 Moreover, market-based 
solutions like litigation179 can keep RPOs and businesses in check and deter the abuse of RPs.180  
 
176 See Friedman, above n 31; E Goldman, ‘The regulation of reputational information’ in B Szorka & 
A Marcus (eds) The Next Digital Decade: Essays on the Future of the Internet (Washington: TechFreedom, 
2010) p 299. 
177 Friedman, above n 31, p 135. 
178  Ibid.  
179 This covers private civil actions instituted by consumers, direct litigation between businesses and 
class actions. 
180 Friedman above n 31, p 147-161. 
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Friedman’s argument is supported by evidence of voluntary self-regulatory efforts 
adopted by RPOs. For instance, Amazon allows verified purchaser badges on reviews which 
help to confirm reviewer authenticity. Google provides a right of reply, which enables 
businesses to respond to information contained in reviews. The RP offered by the UK's health 
and beauty retailer, Boots, indicates when reviews are written by a staff-customer, if reviews 
are part of a promotion and if reviewers received a free sample. This presumably allows 
consumers to decide how much they can trust the information supplied. Others allow users to 
mark reviews as suspicious or helpful and therefore put consumers on notice that a review may 
be unreliable or worth considering.181 Some RPs use software or sting operations to detect fake 
reviews.182 While commendable, these efforts are not consistent on every platform, are often 
non-binding, and no guarantee exists that most RPOs will uniformly adopt such measures. 
Moreover, as pointed out in section two, many RPOs face conflicts of interests which indicates 
that they cannot be trusted to engage neutrally in self-regulation.  
Friedman’s view is further problematic because it still rests on the assumption that 
consumers are rational and that upon detecting that a platform has left itself open to abuse, they 
will abandon it. As highlighted in section 2(d), consumer rationality is not always guaranteed. 
Second, important literature details the weaknesses of private law mechanisms such as 
litigation.183 Plagued with economic, organisational and procedural obstacles, litigation is not 
always a viable option for regulating economic behaviour. Third, Fink points out that isolated 
self-regulation lacks transparency and fails to take into account the interests of other 
 
181 Competition & Markets Authority ‘Online Reviews and Endorsements: Report on CMA’s Call for 
Information’ (June 2015) available at 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/43623
8/Online_reviews_and_endorsements.pdf   (last accessed 15 February 2020)  Para 4.18. 
182 Yelp carried out sting operations to discourage businesses from soliciting fake reviews. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/18/technology/yelp-tries-to-halt-deceptive-reviews.html 
183 S Talesh ‘How the "haves" come out ahead in the twenty-first century’ (2013) 62 DLR 519; M 
Galanter ‘Why the haves come out ahead: speculations on the limits of legal change’ (1974) 9 Law & 
Soc’y Rev 95; AA Leff ‘Injury, ignorance and spite -the dynamics of coercive collection’ (1970) 80 YLJ 
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stakeholders other than the platform.184 Hence, to safeguard public interests, external 
interference may be needed for a counterbalance.185 For these reasons, evidence of self-
regulation should not sustain calls for regulatory non-intervention.   
 
 
b) Relying on existing regulatory frameworks 
 
One can argue that it is more practical to rely on existing frameworks in regulating some of the 
problems highlighted in section two. For instance, before the UK House of Lords’ Select 
Committee on European Union, most witnesses believed that rather than introducing new 
regulations, the European Commission ought to focus on reviewing existing laws and their 
application to online platforms.186 In our context, current regulations, particularly those 
regulating unfair trading practices, may be of great relevance. 
At EU level, the European Commission (the Commission) has made efforts to clarify the 
Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (UCPD)’s application to  RPs.187 The revised Guidance 
on the implementation/application of the UCPD has a section dedicated to ‘user review 
tools’.188 This section provides some insight into how the UCPD may apply. For instance, the 
Commission clarifies that since the UCPD applies to natural and legal persons who qualify as 
‘traders’, it covers consumers who act on behalf of traders when posting reviews. Articles 
6(1)(b) and 7(4)(a) requires that RPOs provide truthful information on the main characteristics 
of their services and therefore should not mislead consumers on the origin of reviews.189 
 
184 M Fink ‘Digital co-regulation: designing a supranational legal framework for the platform economy’ 
(2018) 43(1) ELR 47,56.  
185 Ibid, p 57. 
186 House of Lords, Select Committee on European Union Online Platforms and the Digital Single 
Market (HL Paper 129) https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201516/ldselect/ldeucom/129/129.pdf p 
93. 
187 Similar efforts were made earlier at national level: see the UK’s CMA above n 181: Danish 
Consumer Ombudsman, ‘Guidelines on Publication of User Reviews’ (May 2015) available at 
https://www.consumerombudsman.dk/media/49717/guidelines.pdf  
188 See para 5.2.8, UCPD Guidance available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52016SC0163&from=EN  
189 Ibid.  
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Platforms will engage in a misleading action contrary to Article 6  or a misleading omission 
contrary to Article 7 if they suppress reviews without notifying consumers that they are being 
presented with only selected reviews.190 This could also be a practice contrary to the 
requirements of professional diligence under Article 5(2). Connections between RPOs and 
traders must be disclosed if the connection could materially affect the credibility of reviews.191 
Failing to do so would breach Article 6(1)(c) and 7(2). Fake endorsement of reviews (e.g. 
‘likes’) also breaches Article 6. Where a trader posts fake reviews in the name of consumers, 
they will be acting contrary to point No 22 of Annex I of the UCPD which prohibits ‘falsely 
representing oneself as a consumer.’192  
Relying on the UCPD, however, raises some issues. Like most EU Directives with 
consumer protection themes, the UCPD is drafted in the context of bilateral transactions 
completed between two parties: the trader and consumer.193  The prohibitions in the UCPD 
focus on regulating the conduct of traders and will only apply if parties fall within the relevant 
definitions. CGRs introduce third party considerations which do not always fit with the 
Directive’s party designations. The UCPD defines a trader to mean: 
 ‘any natural or legal person who, in commercial practices covered by this 
Directive, is acting for purposes relating to his trade, business, craft or profession 
and anyone acting in the name of or on behalf of a trader’194  
 





193 Select Committee (HL), above n 186 p 70; C Busch, A Wiewiórowska, F Zoll ‘The rise of the 
platform economy: a new challenge for EU consumer law’ (2016) 5 EuCML, 3, 3.  
194 Article 2(b). 
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‘any act, omission, course of conduct or representation, commercial 
communication including advertising and marketing, by a trader, directly 
connected with the promotion, sale or supply of a product to consumers’195    
 
These definitions are broad and will capture online retailers incorporating RPs 
(supportive platforms). However, it is unclear if stand-alone platforms which only provide a 
forum for posting reviews, without more, can qualify as a trader.  Stand-alone RPs which do 
not offer advertising services may not qualify as engaging in a commercial practice. EU case 
law suggests that the concept of trader is defined by reference to the trader’s commercial 
activity and that the UCPD extends only to commercial practices directly connected with the 
promotion, sale or supply of a product to consumers.196 Applying this, it may be challenging 
to show that simply providing an RP establishes a direct connection to the supply of products 
and services unless an argument is made that the information supplied qualifies as a product.197 
Therefore, the current definitions of trader and consumer may require revision to capture 
transactions falling outside the traditionally defined trader-consumer relationships.198 
Currently, it appears that the UCPD will only be useful in some situations. First, the 
UCPD can be relied on where platforms qualifying as traders (or consumers acting on their 
behalf) are directly involved in practices breaching the Directive. Second, the UCPD will apply 
where platforms collude with traders in manipulating CGRs which mislead consumers (in such 
situations, RPOs will be seen to act on a trader’s behalf).  While this may cover many cases, 
situations falling outside these scenarios may be left outside the UCPD’s reach.  
 
195 Article 2(d). 
196 Case C-59/12, BKK Mobil Oil v Zentrale zur Bekämpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs, October 3, 2013, 
para 35. 
197 One can respond to this by arguing that consumers supply the information while platforms only 
provide a repository. 
198 Written evidence from Citizens Advice (OPL0082) available at 
http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/eu-internal-market-
subcommittee/online-platforms-and-the-eu-digital-single-market/written/26136.html  
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Another concern is that the UCPD may be ill-suited for regulating RPs, which 
continuously evolve due to changing technology. The Commission acknowledges that many 
practices highlighted in the UCPD's annex are designed for the offline world.199 This may 
suggest that the UCPD may be ill-equipped to address specific practices that only occur in 
online settings. Therefore, it seems that a regulatory instrument designed with the peculiarities 
of the online world in mind may be more appropriate.    
 
c) Designing a New Regulatory Landscape: Drawing Inspiration from Co-regulation 
and Standardisation  
 
The Commission has indicated that:  
 
‘where appropriate, self-regulation and co-regulation can often achieve better 
outcomes for enabling the development of strong platform ecosystems in Europe and 
can complement or reinforce the existing legislation that already governs certain 
activities of online platforms.’200  
 
As indicated in section 3(a), this paper takes the view that self-regulation will not be 
appropriate. Alternatively, co-regulation may present a suitable option for regulating RPs. Co-
regulation is a regulatory mechanism whereby:  
 
“a Community legislative act entrusts the attainment of the objectives defined by 
the legislative authority to parties which are recognised in the field (such as 
 
199 European Commission ‘Impact assessment: proposal for a regulation of the European parliament 
and of the council on promoting fairness and transparency for business users of online intermediation 
services’ available at https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=51797 para 5.4.3. 
200 Communication from the Commission on online platforms and the digital single market COM 
(2016) 288 final available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52016DC0288&from=EN) 
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economic operators, the social partners, non-governmental organisations, or 
associations).”201  
 
Essentially, with co-regulation, a regulator defines an objective in a binding legislative 
instrument while the implementation details are prepared by stakeholders in the regulated 
industry. Rather than a separate co-existence, co-regulation combines the use of legislation 
which is binding and predictable with self-regulatory mechanisms which are flexible in a single 
regulatory framework.202 This approach can promote efficiency since it frees up legislative 
capacity and ensures stakeholder involvement.203 It also promises a predictable legal 
framework while giving ‘sufficient flexibility to industry to shape and decide on their voluntary 
commitments, respecting the speed of innovation’204 
Co-regulatory efforts have been endorsed under the EU’s ‘new approach’ to regulation. 
The ‘new approach’ involves the adoption of a legislative instrument which defines essential 
requirements concerning the regulation a matter of public interest and a harmonised standard 
which facilitates the compliance with the essential requirements.205 These standards are 
developed in an institutional setting that supports transparency and stakeholder participation.206 
Where businesses adopt the harmonised standards, they benefit from a presumption of 
conformity with the essential requirements set in the legislation.207  
 
201 Interinstitutional agreement on better law-making (2003/C 321/01) available at https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32003Q1231(01)&from=EN para 18. 
202 Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on "Simplification" (2002/ C 48/28) 
available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52001AE1496&from=EN) 
203 Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on self-regulation and co-regulation in 
the Community legislative framework (2015/ C 291/05) available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52014IE4850&from=EN 
204 above n 199, para 5.4.3. 
205 The European Committee for Standardisation ‘New approach and other directives’ available at 
https://www.cen.eu/work/supportlegislation/directives/pages/default.aspx 
206 C Busch ‘Towards a new approach in European consumer law: standardisation and co-regulation in 
the digital single market’ (2016) EuCML 197,198. 
207 CEN, above n 205. 
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Busch argues that a harmonised regulatory framework for RPs can benefit from adopting 
this ‘new approach’ to regulation.208 Hence, Bush suggests that the regulation of RPs may be 
achieved through a Directive that defines the general regulatory principles combined with a 
European standard formulated by the European Committee for Standardization.209 The role of 
standardisation as a viable regulatory option has been endorsed by the International Standards 
Organisation, which in 2018 published the ISO 20488 (‘the standard’) applicable to online 
consumer reviews.210 The standard provides ‘requirements and recommendations for the 
principles and methods for review administrators to apply to their collection, moderation and 
publication of reviews’211 They apply to all organisations which publish reviews including 
suppliers who collect reviews from their customers and third-party platforms, whether 
independent of the supplier or not.212  Though non-binding, the standard provides an 










i. IMPOSING A HARMONISED DUTY OF CARE 
 
Growing evidence suggests that regulators will demand more accountability from RPOs in the 
near future. For instance, the Commission acknowledges that ‘in respect of access to 
information and content for many parts of society, platforms are increasingly taking centre 
stage. This role, necessarily, brings with it a wider responsibility.’213 In jurisdictions like the 
UK, there are discussions about imposing a duty of care on platforms to prevent online 
 
208 Busch ‘Towards a New approach in European consumer law’ above n 206, p 197; C Busch, 
‘Crowdsourcing Consumer Confidence: how to regulate online rating and review systems in the 
collaborative economy’ (June 15, 2016). Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2799489  p 14. 
209 Busch ‘Crowdsourcing consumer confidence’ above n 208, p 8. 
210 https://www.sis.se/api/document/preview/80004556/ 
211 Para 1 ISO 20488:2018. 
212 Ibid. 
213 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52016DC0288&from=EN 
para 4.10(e).  
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harms.214 The UK’s Competition and Market’s Authority recognises that online platforms 
should supervise their users and ensure they can comply with consumer protection law.215 The 
ISO standards also acknowledge that RPOs should adopt best practices.  
Accordingly, this paper proposes a new regulatory framework that imposes a duty of care 
on RPOs. This duty of care will require that RPOs reasonably ensure that mechanisms are put 
in place to discourage the abuse of RPs. Broadly drafted, such duty will apply to all RPOs who 
provide a forum accessible to consumers located in the EU for the sharing and publication of 
reviews.216 The duty will be owed to all platform users located in the EU and will cover 
consumers whose transactional decisions may be affected by the abuse of RPs.  
As the intermediaries central to the information exchange facilitated through CGRs, 
RPOs wield significant influence. As seen in section 2(a)(iii), they control the platforms and 
can re-engineer information by highlighting or suppressing positive/negative CGRs. Hence, it 
is justifiable that obligations are imposed on them to support the provision of fair information. 
 
ii. HOW WILL THE PROPOSAL WORK? 
Owing to the cross-border reach of RPs, regulatory efforts at EU level will be more appropriate 
as this will provide a coherent and harmonised approach to regulation. Fragmented national 
regimes217 will create uncertainty and confusion for consumers and businesses, and this will, 




215 Select Committee (HoL) above n 186, p 71. 
216 Which include supportive and stand-alone operators, regardless of where they are established. As 
this proposal focuses on consumer protection, it seems inappropriate to apply thresholds exempting 
specific platforms from the duty. 
217 E.g. see France’s Digital Republic Act (French Act No. 2016-1321) and Law N. 1321 (Loi pour une 
République numérique of October 7,2016) which introduce regulations applying to online platforms; 
Germany’s Network Enforcement Act (NetzDG) 2017 which regulates online social media platforms. 
218 Busch ‘Crowdsourcing consumer confidence’ above n 208, p 2. 
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Building on Busch’s suggestion, the proposed regime will adopt a co-regulatory 
approach. Hence, to avoid a disproportionate response, a legislative instrument can define the 
scope and essential elements of the duty of care while guidelines and industry codes can 
elaborate on how RPOs may meet the duty.  
Instead of a Directive as suggested by Busch, this paper proposes the use of a Regulation 
as the legislative instrument of choice. This is for several reasons. First, it addresses concerns 
about regulatory coherence in the Single Market since Regulations introduce mandatory rules 
at Union level.219 Second, a Regulation will not be subject to transposition delays associated 
with Directives. This will promote certainty, which results from the uniform and immediate 
application of adopted rules. Third, it conforms with recent regulatory initiatives in the EU 
focusing on online platforms. For instance, to promote fairness and transparency for business 
users of online platforms, the EU’s instrument of choice was a Regulation (i.e. the Online 
Platform Regulation).220  
To clarify how RPOs may meet the duty of care, the Commission can develop guidelines 
which endorse the ISO standard.221 In line with co-regulatory principles, it can also encourage 
and endorse industry codes of practice. An RPO can demonstrate that it has met its duty of care 
if it conforms with standards/codes of practice developed by industry. 
Such industry codes may build on the ISO standards in articulating more specific 
measures for meeting the duty of care. The ISO standards require that RPOs take certain 
principles into account when planning, designing and delivering RPs. These principles include 
 
219 For a discussion on the use of regulations in EU consumer law, see C Twigg-Flesner ‘Good-bye 
harmonisation by directives, hello cross-border only regulation?’ - a way forward for EU consumer 
contract law (2011) 7(2) ERCL 235. 
220 Regulation (EU) 2019/1150. 
221 Along with guidelines to be issued by the European Commission, the Online Platform Regulation 
encourages industry participants to draw up codes of conduct which support compliance with the 
regulatory requirements: Article 17. 
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integrity, accuracy, privacy, security, transparency, accessibility and responsiveness.222 These 
principles reflect common themes in existing regulatory efforts and academic work in the 
area.223 These themes cover the collection, processing, moderation and publication of reviews. 
It also includes matters relating to transparency in the use of consolidated reviews and the 
disclosure of existing commercial relationships. The common themes suggest that convergence 
is occurring, and the proposed intervention will provide a framework for codifying these 
developments.  
The advantages of this approach are manifold. First, these efforts can place RPOs in a 
position to reduce some of the problems identified in section two. For instance, requiring that 
RPOs adopt best practices in processing reviews can address the prevalence of fake reviews. 
Reliance on misleading information may be reduced if RPOs are required to disclose paid 
reviews and commercial relationships with businesses. Time limits imposed on the visibility 
of published reviews can address concerns about consumers relying on outdated reviews 
where, for instance, terms and conditions have changed. Requiring that RPOs include 
prominent notices advising consumers to consider contract terms along with CGRs may nudge 
consumers to review the fine print. 
Second, a broadly drafted duty of care whose implementation is supported by industry 
codes allows for future-proofing. Rapidly changing technology will affect how RPs evolve, 
and an overly prescriptive framework will be ineffective. Industry codes are flexible and can 
be regularly updated to reflect changing technology and consumer behaviour. Third, a duty of 
care focuses on an objective – in this context, preventing the abuse of RPs – and leaves the 
 
222 Para 4.1 
223 The work carried out by the French national organisation for standardisation: Association Française 
de Normalisation (AFNOR) influenced these standards. Other influential efforts include the Danish 
Guidelines, above n 208;  The UK CMA’s report, above n 201;   The Draft Directive on Online 
intermediary Platforms developed by the Research Group on the law of digital services under the umbrella 
of the European Law Institute available at https://www.elsi.uni-
osnabrueck.de/fileadmin/user_upload/English.pdf  
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detail of the means to those best placed to come up with solutions.224 This fits with the co-
regulatory approach favoured by the EU. Fourth, a duty of care does not exclude the possibility 
of other measures and can provide a foundation for more detailed interventions to target 
specific circumstances.225  Finally, industry efforts which are designed within a binding 




iii. COMPATIBILITY WITH EXISTING LIABILITY REGIMES 
 
The current liability regime applying to online platforms is set under the E-commerce Directive 
(ECD).226 The ECD harmonises limitations on liability for online intermediaries that provide 
caching227 or hosting services228 or which act as a mere conduit of information.229 Relevant to 
our discussion is the fact that online platforms will not be liable for any illegal content hosted 
(or stored) on their platform if they are not aware of such information and if upon obtaining 
knowledge, they act expeditiously in removing or disabling access to such information.230  
The liability exemptions cover civil, criminal and administrative liability regarding all 
illegal activities initiated by third parties online, including unfair commercial practices and 
misleading advertising.231 In our context, this means that RPOs will benefit from the existing 
exemptions and will not be liable for (potentially) defamatory or false third-party reviews. EU 
 
224 LWoods and W Perrin ‘Online harm reduction – a statutory duty of care and regulator’ (April 2019) 
available at https://d1ssu070pg2v9i.cloudfront.net/pex/carnegie_uk_trust/2019/04/08091652/Online-
harm-reduction-a-statutory-duty-of-care-and-regulator.pdf p 28. 
225 Ibid, p 8. 
226 Directive 2000/31/EC. 
227 Article 13. 
228 Article 14. 
229 Article 12. 
230 Articles 14(1)(a) & (b). In other jurisdictions like the United States, online platforms also enjoy 
liability exemptions for third-party content: see 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012). 
231 L Rozenfeldova and P Sokol 'Liability regime of online platforms new approaches and perspectives' 
(2019) 3 ECLIC 866, 870. 
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case law supports this conclusion. For instance, Busch et al report that in 2015, in an action 
brought by a hotel business against a hotel review site operator, a German federal court held 
that the operator was not liable for a third-party review which suggested that the hotel had 
bedbugs.232    
One pressing question is how the proposed framework in this paper will fit with the 
ECD’s liability regime. It is argued that the proposal is not incompatible with the ECD’s regime 
for several reasons. First, recital 48 of the ECD states that the Directive: 
 
 ‘does not affect the possibility for Member States of requiring service 
providers, who host information provided by recipients of their service, to 
apply duties of care, which can reasonably be expected from them and which 
are specified by national law, in order to detect and prevent certain types of 
illegal activities.’  
 
This suggests that the ECD permits other forms of liability arising from imposed duties 
of care as long as they are not incompatible with the exemptions in the Directive. Second, the 
ECD emphasises that Member States should not impose a general obligation on internet 
intermediaries to monitor information which they transmit or store neither should there be an 
obligation to actively seek out facts or circumstances indicating illegality.233 The proposal 
complies with this because RPOs are not required to police review content or to ensure absolute 






232  BGH, 19.03.2015, MMR 2015, 726 – Hotelbewertungsportal cited in Busch ‘Crowdsourcing 
consumer confidence’, above n 229, p 11. 
233 Article 15. 
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Informed decision-making is crucial to protecting the interest of consumers. Traditionally, 
consumers have mainly relied on information emanating from businesses to bridge information 
gaps. However, with the growth of the internet, consumers increasingly rely on other sources 
of information such as CGRs. CGRs affect consumer decision-making and therefore warrant 
closer inquiry. This paper has focused on highlighting the problems associated with CGRs 
which justify regulatory scrutiny. The paper has also laid out possible regulatory responses to 
some of these problems. Owing to their role as communication intermediaries, this paper 
suggests that RPOs are central to regulatory efforts aimed at minimising the abuse of review 
platforms. 
 
